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Introduction
T
his paper surveys the state of the debate over the 
causes, character and con-sequences of corrup-
tion in Russia. The main argument is that while 
there is broad agreement over these questions, there are 
few credible suggestions to explain how Russia will 
escape from its current impasse.
Corruption has not traditionally been a subject that 
has attracted the attention of political scientists. The 
study of corruption has largely been the province of 
investigative reporters: from the very beginning, in the 
U.S., it was “muckraking” journalists who exposed the 
phenomenon. In the literature on the politics of transi-
tion in socialist countries, it was journalists who first 
drew attention to the prominent role of corruption.1 
And among academic disciplines, it is anthropology, 
with its analysis of reciprocal gift-giving and patronage 
networks, that is most comfortable with the analysis of 
corruption.2
Political scientists and economists traditionally 
tended to treat corruption as a marginal phenomenon, 
a regrettable example of deviant behavior that did not 
seriously affect one’s analysis of the political/economic 
system.3 However, it has become increasingly clear that
1 For journalists writing on Russian corruption, see Stephen 
Handleman, Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafiya (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); David Kotz and Fred 
Weir, Revolution From Above (London: Routledge, 1997).
2 The leading investigator of the scandal surrounding the USAID- 
funded work in Moscow of the Harvard Institute for International 
Development is anthropologist Janine R. Wedel. See her Janine 
Wedel, “Cliques and Clans and Aid to Russia,” Transitions, July 
1997.
3 For samples of serious work on the issue, see Arnold 
Heidenheimer et al (eds.), Political Corruption: A Handbook
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); John Girling, 
Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy (New York: Routledge,
in the transition economies (as in most of the develop-
ing world) the issue of corruption had become impossi-
ble to ignore. Corrupt practices were not merely para-
sitical on an otherwise healthy body politic and market 
economy: to a worrying degree, corruption had become 
a central, structural feature of the logic of political and 
economic behavior.
By 1997 authorities from the World Bank to Jeffrey 
Sachs were for the first time acknowledging that a 
successful transition to capitalism required that more 
attention be directed towards promoting the rule of 
law.4 The initial operating assumption back in 1989-92 
was that liberalization would create the incentives for 
profit-seeking behavior. This would lead to the emer-
gence of new social actors (entrepreneurs, workers and 
consumers) who would have a vested interest in the 
new market economy. These groups would realize that 
it is in their interest to help create the social institutions 
necessary to the smooth functioning of a market 
economy—clearly defined property rights, enforceable 
contracts, fair and transparent government regulation. 
The introduction of democracy would give them the 
chance to translate their demand for market institutions 
into public policy. The main political threat to market 
transition was seen as lying in the desire of bureaucrats 
and some groups of workers to try to turn the clock 
back to central planning. Even as late as 1996 Boris 
Yeltsin ran an election campaign by painting commu-
nism, and not corruption, as the main threat to social 
progress in Russia—and he received the unanimous 
support of Western governments and international 
agencies.
1997); Robin Theobald, Corruption, Development and 
Underdevelopment (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990).
4 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katarina Pistor (eds.), The Rule of Law and 
Economic Reform in Russia (Boulder, Col: Westview Press,
1997); World Bank 1997 World Development Report.
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Alas, something went wrong in Russia and most of 
the other Soviet successor states. Liberalization led to 
short-run' profiteering rather than long-run profit 
seeking. Few social actors emerged with a commitment 
to institution-building. As of August 1998, the official 
position of the IMF, World Bank and U.S. government 
is that the market reform pursued (fitfully) by Russia 
since 1991 was and still is the only feasible alternative 
for Russia. They now concede, however, that market 
liberalization should have been accompanied by more 
determined efforts at institution-building to promote the 
rule of law.
Political scientists were perhaps even slower to 
adapt to the souring of the Russian transition than were 
economists. Corruption still tends to be seen as some-
thing that should be studied by legal scholars, a blot on 
the body politic that belongs in the category of “crime 
and social problems.” Despite a growing recognition 
that corruption has deeply penetrated Russian political 
and economic elites, few political scientists have tried 
to systematically analyze the phenomena of organized 
crime, “clan politics” and their implications for the 
Russian political system.
The purpose of this paper is therefore twofold. 
First, to alert political scientists to the dimensions of 
the corruption issue in Russia and the challenge it 
poses to our conventional understanding of the demo-
cratic transition. Second, the goal is to question the 
assumptions behind the way that economists are 
conceptualizing the problem of corruption and to argue 
that political science has a specific role to play.
What Is Corruption?
It is clear that the contemporary Russian economy, 
from the corner store up to the federal budget, is far 
removed from the “perfect competition” theory to be 
found in economics textbooks. This deviation from 
orthodox models of how an economy operates is often 
explained by reference to the spread of “corruption,” 
conventionally defined as the abuse of public office for 
private gain.
This definition has several problematic aspects. 
First, it has a strong moral connotation: the behavior 
described as “corruption” is prejudged as necessarily 
“bad.” Second, it presupposes that one can readily 
distinguish between two spheres: a public sector on one 
hand and private interests on the other. Once this is 
assumed, the battle against corruption is half-won: the 
authorities simply have to strengthen the barrier be-
tween public and private. In Russia, however, and in 
many other societies, the separation between public and
private is not clear-cut, and must be explained and 
analyzed, not assumed.
Hence we will proceed by describing the behavior 
we wish to investigate as “rule evasion” rather than 
corruption. “Rule evasion” is a less pejorative term 
than corruption, and is open to the interpretation that 
such behavior can be individually rational and even 
socially functional. It is also a broader term than 
corruption, encompassing all behavior involving 
deviation from laws and formal procedures.
Second, using the term “corruption” implies that the 
behavior is confined to a small deviant section of 
society: parasites on an otherwise healthy social 
organism. Rule-evasion may be more pervasive than is 
implied by the term corruption. Indeed, it may be 
endemic to the core functions of the political organism 
and not merely a feature of its “parasitic” and dysfunc-
tional elements.
The difference between corruption and rule evasion 
is more than mere semantics. Officials and business-
men may be behaving rationally and often responsibly 
by engaging in rule evasion in an situation far removed 
from a mature market economy, characterized by legal 
nihilism; inadequate liberalization; intense 
politicization of economic decision-making; deficient 
institutional infrastructure; prevalence of barter trade; 
widespread arrears in meeting contractual and tax 
obligations, and so forth.
How Bad Is Corruption?
Some commentators are prepared to argue that 
corruption is not necessarily a barrier to social prog-
ress. They note that corruption to a degree is present in 
all societies, and that it can serve some useful social 
functions.
In economic terms, the spread of corruption can 
undermine traditional, inefficient patterns of economic 
organization (communist bureaucracies, in the Russian 
case), clearing the field for new capitalist forms. Some 
would argue that it can encourage the spread of profit- 
seeking, market-oriented behavior.5 Bribery of state 
officials, for example, may enable entrepreneurs to get 
around archaic rules and regulations hostile to the 
development of markets and hence economic prosper-
5 For example, “the ability to evade rules helps prevent increased 
government regulation and, in some cases, leads to a 
rationalization of laws.” Jim Leitzel, “Lessons of the Russian 
economic transition,” Problems of Post-Communism (January- 
February 1997), pp. 49-55, p. 55.
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ity.6 7Organized crime may provide entrepreneurs with 
personal security and contract enforcement which the 
public judicial system is too weak to provide. Hence 
in countries such as Indonesia or China over the past 
decade we have seen very high levels of corruption 
coinciding with rapid rates of economic growth. The 
living standard of the general population in those 
countries was also rising, although at a slower pace 
than that of the economic elite.
In political terms, corruption may be a messy but 
necessary lubricant, forging political alliances between 
otherwise antagonistic groups. The creation of patron-
age networks can bring a sense of order and hierarchy 
out of incipient social anarchy. The pyramid of favors 
and obligations may reach down deep into society, 
giving even ordinary people a sense of belonging and 
a stake in the future. This is the argument made in 
seeking to explain the persistence for more than a 
century of organized crime in Sicily, for example.8 
Thus there may be a tradeoff between the social stabil-
ity which corruption can provide and the greater 
economic efficiency which would flow from more open 
market competition.
The U.S. itself went through a “robber baron” 
phase at the end of the nineteenth century. A concentra-
tion of economic power in the hands of a few monopo-
lists seemed to be necessary to create national indus-
tries of railways, steel and oil. Meanwhile, in the cities 
the millions of new immigrants were absorbed into the 
democratic process through Tammany-hall style 
machine politics. However, this concentration of 
economic and political power in the U.S. soon pro-
duced its own antithesis. The democratic process threw 
up the progressive movement, which waged a success-
ful war on corruption and broke up the trusts. The 
analogy implies that corruption is just a phase, perhaps 
even a necessary phase through which the national 
organism will pass on its way to political and economic 
maturity.
However, a correlation of levels of perceived 
corruption in various nations with their economic 
growth performance suggests that in most countries
corruption is inimical to economic growth.9 Corruption 
may accompany growth driven by public sector spend-
ing, but much of this may be pork-barrel driven “roads 
to nowhere” that do not contribute to social welfare.10 
Correlating the absolute level of GDP and perceived 
corruption also suggests that, generally speaking, the 
richer the country, the lower the level of corruption. 
With the Asian meltdown over the past year, the 
Indonesian model of economic growth plus rising 
social inequality does not look so attractive.
In the Russian case, the argument that corruption 
may be the price you have to pay for economic growth 
is something of a moot point, since the economy shrank 
for seven straight years. After stabilizing in 1997 (GDP 
grew by an anemic 0.8% that year), the economic 
contraction resumed in 1998. Russian corruption has 
not been parasitical on a healthy, growing economy. 
Rather, it has flourished amid the decaying remains of 
the corpse of the Soviet economy.
The Hierarchy
of Rule-evading Behavior
In looking at the role of corruption, it is important 
to recognize that there is a hierarchy of rule-evading 
behavior of varying types. Talk of corruption in Russia 
is often conflated with the role of organized crime: that 
is, criminal gangs relying upon violence or the threat of 
violence.11 Organized crime is best viewed as a subset 
of rule evasion: the two phenomena are related, but 
distinct. Rule evasion in Russia is a widespread and 
entrenched phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the 
antics of Mafia gangs.
Let us begin at the level of the individual. Casual 
observation reveals that most Russians have no com-
punction about evading taxes or other government 
regulations (such as those forbidding citizens from 
having bank accounts abroad). On the contrary, even 
professionals who should be at the forefront of the 
struggle to introduce legal norms—journalists and 
lawyers—often freely explain to foreign visitors the
6 Nathaniel Leff, “Economic development through bureaucratic 
corruption." American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 8, no. 3 
(November 1964).
7 Federico Varese, “Is Sicily the future of Russia?” Archives 
Europeenes de Sociologie, vol. 35, no 2.
8 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private
Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
9 Paulo Mauro, “Corruption and growth,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, no. 110 (1995).
10 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, “Corruption, public investment 
and growth,” IMF Working Paper 97/139 (1997). Japan will 
spend $278 billion on public works this year: more than the 
Pentagon’s annual budget. Sandra Sugawara, “Japanese 
construction trade built on cronyism,” Washington Post, 31 
January 1998.
11 On organized crime see the special issue of Demokratizatsiya, 
vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer 1994); Tanya Frisby, “The rise of organized 




various ways in which their employer avoids paying 
taxes on their salaries. (A favorite technique is paying 
them with insurance payments or bank loans as a way 
of avoiding personal income tax.). As a result of such 
strategies, income from employment (wages and 
salaries) has shrunk to about 45% of total reported 
income. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that when 
confronted with a rule, Russians’ first reaction is to 
look for a way around it.
This pattern has a parallel in moral reasoning. The 
Soviet-era adage “he who does not steal from the state, 
steals from his own family” still has some resonance. 
Moral behavior in Russia is judged primarily in terms 
of honest treatment of family and friends, rather than 
conformity with more abstract rules such as public 
laws. The view that morality resides in the private and 
not the public sphere crystallized in the Soviet era, 
when involvement in public life (Communist Party 
membership, etc.) was seen by most people as requiring 
conformity to an amoral and false public rhetoric. 
Soviet man inhabited a “gray zone” where behavior 
was regulated by custom, but not by law.12 3 This polar-
ization of private morality and public deceit is obvi-
ously inimical to the development of any sort of public 
order, but especially one based on notions of civil 
society and a voluntary compact between rulers and 
ruled. The introduction of competitive elections since 
1991 has not apparently been sufficient to promote a 
new sense of respect for public institutions.
Moving up from individual behavior to the level of 
small businesses, one finds private entrepreneurs 
trapped between rapacious state tax and regulatory 
officials, on one side, and equally rapacious criminal 
gangs, on the other. A great deal of commerce takes 
place in the “shadow economy,” not reported to official 
agencies in a bid to avoid Russia’s tough and often 
arbitrary tax laws. Enterprises often pay bribes to 
officials in order to stay in business. A World Bank 
survey of 50 small businessmen found the proportion 
admitting to paying bribes to various categories of 
official ranged from 21% (tax inspectors) to 40-50% 
(for export/import licenses), to 100% (for phone 
installation).14 At the same time most owners of stores 
and service outlets have to pay protection money (either
12 Aleksandr Kirpichnikov, Vzyatka i korruptsiya v Rossii 
[Bribery and Corruption in Russia] (St. Petersburg: Alpha, 1997)
13 Victor Sergeyev, The Wild East. Crime and Lawlessness in 
Post-Communist Russia (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1998), chapter 
3.
14 Daniel Kaufman, “Why is Ukraine's economy not growing?” 
Transition (World Bank), voi. 8, no. 2, (April 1997), pp. 5-8.
to criminal gangs, to criminal-like security services, or 
to the police) in order to stay in business. This practice, 
which anecdotal evidence suggests is pervasive, has 
been a severe constraint on the development of small 
businesses in Russia. The payments range from 10 to 
50 percent of overall turnover, and this helps explain 
why everything from beer to toothpaste tends to be 
more expensive in Russia than, say, Poland (which also 
has its own problems with organized crime).
Moving further up the economic hierarchy, at the 
level of the enterprise it is clear that many transactions 
depend for their success on the firm’s position in local 
elite networks. This is true whether it is a question of 
renting premises, shipping goods on the railway, or 
avoiding paying wages and taxes. Despite protestations 
that Russia has introduced a market economy since 
1991, barter trade still accounts for about 40% of 
industrial turnover (and has increased since 1992). 
Barter involves both the physical exchange of commod-
ities, and the use of various types of non-monetary 
financial instruments (bills of exchange, tax waivers, 
etc.). Such barter transactions are very difficult for the 
tax authorities to monitor: that indeed is one of the 
mairireasons for their popularity. Other reasons include 
the simple absence of cash—barter ballooned in 1992 
as the government tried to tighten monetary policy. It 
may also reflect a desire to avoid price controls, which 
still apply to the gas, electric and railway utilities 
(where one finds the heaviest reliance on barter).
The barter trade is embedded in local networks of 
factory directors and political bosses. Thus, for exam-
ple, an enterprise will agree to provide construction 
materials and workers to repair roads for the local 
government, in return the latter will agree to write off 
the project as provision of “tax in kind.” The officials 
presumably have their own way of keeping track of the 
ebb and flow of favors. This way of doing business is 
already familiar to them from the days of the centrally 
planned economy, when informal bargaining for scarce 
inputs took place in parallel to the formal adherence to 
plan targets. It has persisted since 1991, and has proved 
fairly impervious to faltering efforts to introduce 
Western-style accountancy procedures.
It is hard to separate “illegitimate” and “legitimate” 
practices in the Russian economy—either before or 
after 1991. Some of the barter deals may represent 
honest efforts by selfless managers to, say, provide 
resources to keep hospitals and kindergartens in opera-
tion. But many of the deals, such as those channeled 
through intermediary firms privately owned by the 
managers, are used to generate hidden profits that are 




There are no reliable estimates of the size of the 
shadow economy not captured in official GDP statis-
tics. The State Statistics Committee itself officially 
boosts GDP figures by 23% to allow for unreported 
activity. Most observers consider this an underestimate. 
(In June 1998 the top leadership of Goskomstat was 
arrested for, among other things, taking bribes in return 
for underreporting enterprise output.) According to the 
former Interior Minister Anatolii Kulikov, the shadow 
economy accounts for an estimated 45% of all eco-
nomic activity in Russia (equivalent to over $100 
billion a year).15
The shadow economy not only decisively influences 
the daily operations of most enterprises, it has also 
shaped the allocation of property rights. The privatiza-
tion process has seen 70% of Russia’s state-owned 
industry transformed into privately owned joint-stock 
companies over the past decade. In each of its three 
stages, privatization was characterized by rule-evasion 
rather than rule-obedience.
The first stage of “spontaneous privatization” in 
1988-91 saw individual firms spring up on the basis of 
assets leased from the state sector, or the granting of 
special permission to create a private company on the 
basis of a state corporation. The reformers promised 
that the second stage of voucher privatization, launched 
in 1992, would create a new share-owning middle 
class. In fact, it delivered assets into the hands of 
insiders, either Soviet-era industrialists or new-era 
bankers. The third phase of cash auctions since 1995 
has seen a series of rigged deals, virtually none of 
which would pass scrutiny as open, competitive trans-
actions.
Finally, moving from the economic to the political 
scene one also sees a high degree of rule-aversion. 
President Boris Yeltsin dismissed the parliament in 
1993, in an action of dubious constitutionality, and then 
pushed through a new constitution that granted him 
broad leeway to rule as he sees fit with few legislative 
constraints. Regional legislatures have passed thou-
sands of laws and decrees that violate the Russian 
federal constitution. Constitutionally-guaranteed rights, 
such as the option to refuse military service, or to live 
where one chooses without police permission, are 
routinely violated by local organs despite court pro-
tests. Yeltsin generally tolerated these rule-infractions 
by regional leaders, who in turn offered him political 
support.
The situation in political life is not completely bleak 
from the point of view of rule-adherence. National
elections have been held on time in a more or less free 
and fair manner, and Yeltsin has avoided direct viola-
tion of the constitutional rights of the legislative and 
judicial branches. The problem in national politics is 
not so much overt violation of rules, but the fact that 
there are too many gray areas that are not covered by 
any existing legislation. For example, the role of the 
presidential administration (the effective power-center 
of Russia) is not legally defined, nor are there any rules 
pertaining to campaign financing.
One issue demanding research and reflection is the 
way that these various levels of rule-evasion coexist 
and interact. Clearly, at the very least there is a high 
degree of congruence and compatibility between rule- 
evasion at the level of the individual citizen, the enter-
prise, and political leaders. But how tightly the levels 
interact is not known. It is generally assumed that the 
linkage between economic clans and political leaders is 
very close, that the former provide funding for the latter 
and expect favors in return. But just how direct are the 
ties between these elites and the networks of organized 
crime remains an open question.
Historical Origins
The current situation of endemic rule-evasion in 
Russia is the product of rapid market transition intro-
duced into an economy and society shaped by seven 
decades of authoritarian rule and central planning. In 
pointing to the pre-1991 roots of post-1991 corruption, 
one should not lapse into determinism, and assume that 
Russia is doomed by its history to a distorted and 
corrupted market transition for the foreseeable future.
Still, one can argue that rule-evading behavior in 
Russia has deep cultural roots. In Tsarist times political 
authority, and the state in general, were seen as sepa-
rate from society and were viewed with suspicion by 
both the common people and intelligentsia. Neither 
ruler nor ruled felt particularly constrained by rules: 
political debate was couched more in terms of power, 
order, obligation and justice than legality per se.
In the Stalinist era the gulf between state and 
society widened still further. There was an explosion of 
rule-making by state bureaucracies, but these rules 
were enforced through violence in an arbitrary and 
unpredictable manner. Both ordinary people and 
officials developed ways of “beating the system” 
through creating informal networks of trust. The state 
generally turned a blind eye to such practices, recogniz-
ing that they were functional to social stability and to 
the smooth operation of the economy. Anti-corruption
15 Cited in Obshchaya Gazeta, no. 30, August 1998.
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campaigns made only a small dent into the entrenched 
patronage networks of the Brezhnev era.16 17
This historical acceptance of rule-evasion seems to 
have carried over to the new democratic Russia that 
emerged after 1991. Apart from continuity at the level 
of social norms, there was also continuity at the level of 
social organizations. Organized crime networks, which 
were forged in the labor camps of the Soviet Union, 
found that opportunities for their services (protection 
rackets, money laundering, smuggling, prostitution) 
increased during the economic liberalization which 
began in the perestroika period. These criminal gangs 
proved to be one of the social institutions most able to 
adapt and flourish in the shift from plan to market.
Exactly how widespread is organized crime in the 
new Russia is a matter of some controversy. The 
Russian public perceives it to play an important role, 
and in Western popular imagery (i.e., Hollywood) the 
Mafia has replaced the Communist Party/KGB as the 
spirit behind the Evil Empire. But it is not clear just to 
what extent criminal gangs have extended their influ-
ence through the various layers of the shadow econ-
omy. The level of banditism seems to be lower in 
Russia than in, say, Chechnya or Colombia: the crimi-
nals have not managed to establish physical control 
over large chunks of territory. The crime of kidnapping 
for ransom is not widespread, and seems mainly 
confined to mutual feuds between gangs of Caucasian 
origin. Another factor muddying the waters is the fact 
that local police organs (Ministry of Interior, Tax 
Police, Federal Security Service) often seem to have a 
degree of competition and collaboration with the 
criminal groups. For example, 80% of the security 
services guarding property in Moscow are provided 
under contract by personnel from the official security 
organs.
The Communist Party elite has also shown a degree 
of adaptability by surviving the market transition with 
a degree of political and economic power still in its 
hands. However, it would be a mistake to treat this vast 
bureaucratic host as a monolith. The nomenklatura 
system was a set of bureaucratic procedures for the 
recruitment and promotion of cadres, it was not a secret 
society or a tightly-knit group of people with common 
interests and values. The nomenklatura as a sociologi-
cal group (about 2 million strong) had deep internal 
divisions—ideologists versus economic managers, for 
example—and was separated into distinct compart-
ments by economic sector (the military-industrial 
complex, energetiki, agrarians).
Some organizations of the communist era, such as 
the Komsomol or academic institutes, proved to be 
good training grounds (in terms of skills, values and 
contacts) for the new capitalist elite. While individu-
als used these organizations as a springboard to launch 
themselves into the market economy, the institutions 
themselves did not, by and large, survive the post- 
Soviet transition (at least not with the same status they 
enjoyed prior to 1991).
Although one can see a degree of continuity in 
social values from the communist era, and a degree of 
continuity in the composition of elite groups, there 
have been radical changes in the formal institutions 
through which political and economic life is managed 
in Russia since 1991. These rapid changes have in-
volved the swift collapse of many old institutions and 
a much slower and more hesitant building of new 
institutions. Given the collapse of formal institutions, 
the persistence of informal values and networks looms 
even larger in shaping the development of post-1991 
Russian society.
Corruption and Political Life
While rule-evasion was becoming a norm of life in 
the new market economy, it was also invading the 
nascent political sphere of democratic Russia. This 
trend is visible both in the way the political elite 
conducts its business, and in the relations between the 
elite and the masses.
Polls suggested that by 1997 the Russian public had 
come to believe that the Mafia had replaced the 
nomenklatura as the shadowy power ruling their 
country. An August 1997 poll asked respondents “Who 
do you believe runs Russia?” A remarkable 52% 
selected as their first choice “the Mafia, organized 
crime,” followed by “the state apparatus” (21%), the 
president (14%), regional authorities (11%) and the 
government (10%).19 Other polls confirm that the level 
of public trust in national and local political leaders and 
political institutions in general is extremely low.
A natural consequence of the public’s suspicion 
that “all politicians are crooks” has been their willing-
ness to elect to public office candidates of dubious 
moral probity. Criminals themselves are keen to get
16 William Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom 
(New York: ME Sharpe, 1993).
17 Sergeyev, chapter 6.
18 Steven Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in 
Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
19 Poll of Institute for Sociology of Parliamentarism, cited in 
Moskovskii Komsomolets, 5 September 1997.
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elected, since this may bring either immunity from 
prosecution or political connections which can dissuade 
prosecutors.20 A striking example of this was the 
March 1998 election of Andrei Klimentev, a nightclub 
owner and thrice-convicted criminal, as mayor of 
Nizhnii Novgorod, the fourth-largest city in Russia. 
The election commission struck down the results of the 
election, citing vague procedural irregularities. One 
month later Klimentev himself was sentenced to six 
years in jail on fraud charges.21 In October 1997 a local 
criminal boss, Gennadii Konyakhin, was elected mayor 
of Leninsk-Kuznetskii in a Siberian coalmining region. 
Local residents actually demonstrated on his behalf 
after he was removed from office on Moscow’s orders.
President Yeltsin won re-election as president in 
July 1996 despite the fact that between the first and 
second rounds of the election two campaign aides were 
discovered carrying a Xerox box with $500,000 cash 
out of the Kremlin. The legal case against the aides was 
dropped at the end of the year, when the law expired 
which had made it illegal to handle large amounts of 
foreign currency without Central Bank registration. 
(Also, it transpired that no one had come forward to 
report the money as missing.)
Within the space of a few years Russia made the 
transition from a political system based on a single 
ruling party to a pluralistic, electoral democracy. Russia 
has not yet experienced a turnover of power in the key 
political position of the presidency, but the June 1996 
presidential election was generally regarded as free and 
fair by the international community. However, by 1995- 
96 it became commonplace to see decision-making in 
the Russian government and presidential administration 
as heavily influenced by a set of financial “clans” or 
oligarchs. These magnates used their capital to gain 
control over media outlets, and made their cash and 
publicity machinery available to chosen candidates in 
elections. In the new system money has replaced 
ideology as the currency of power, the glue holding 
together the political elite.
The reliance of elites on clan politics, on the one 
hand, and public acceptance of rule-evasion as perva-
sive, on the other, creates a vicious circle of self-
20 For comparison, in India it is estimated that more than 10% of 
the candidates in the 1996 parliamentary elections had criminal 
records. See John Bums, “In India, Criminals Take to the 
Campaign Trail, ” New York Times, 26 February 1998.
21 Former Nizhnii Novgorod governor Boris Nemtsov was also 
implicated in the Klementev loan fraud. See Jamestown 
Foundation Monitor, 13 August 1998; Institute forEastWest 
Studies Russian Regional Report, no 22 (1998).
reinforcing political behavior. Corruption infiltrates 
and undermines the very processes that have the 
potential to keep it in check—the legal system, the 
security organs, the electoral process. This makes it 
very difficult to identify and encourage anti-entropic 
processes which can stem the tide of corruption.
The Prospects
for a Reduction in Corruption
Much of the writing on corruption in transition 
economies adopts a hortatory character. Liberal critics 
of the situation in Russia argue that corruption is bad 
for democracy and bad for long-run economic growth. 
They therefore insist that Russia must adopt rule of law 
if it is to move forward - without explaining how 
precisely Russia can get from the present anarchy to a 
law-based system.
One can sketch out five possible paths (not mutu-
ally exclusive) through which Russia could move in the 
direction of more rule-adherence and less rule-evasion. 
All of the solutions have one thing in common; they 
require time. Rule-observation, and rule-evasion, hinge 
on collective expectations. Expectations about whether 
other persons will obey or ignore rules are primarily 
based on observations of past behavior. Russian society 
is facing a prisoner’s dilemma of rule-evasion, in which 
everyone was defecting from rule-obedience through 
70 years of a socialist economy and 7 years of an 
ostensibly market economy. Russians can see that it 
would be in their interest to live in a society with rules 
which everyone obeys, but in a society where one 
expects others to evade the rules, there is no incentive 
for a single individual to start obeying them.
(1) Introduce liberal institutions. This approach, central 
to the policy adopted by the U.S. government towards 
Russia, posits the step-by-step construction of a rule- 
of-law based society through the introduction of tried- 
and-true Western institutions: freedom of the press, an 
independent judiciary, tight anti-corruption legislation; 
a professional and well-paid civil service. The driving 
force in this approach is the emulation of Western 
experience. Just as companies strive to adopt the “best 
practice” of the world’s most advanced corporations, so 
Russian politicians should realize that liberal democ-
racy is the best system of political organization. Aid 
and trade opportunities have often been tied (at least 
rhetorically) to the adoption of Western institutions. 
Over the past five years the World Bank has started to 
make the adoption of anti-corruption measures an 




There is no question that these liberal institutions 
can help battle corruption. A free press clearly plays a 
pivotal role in mounting a challenge to corruption. By 
and large, it is only through the media that we learn 
about corrupt behavior, and press exposure can force 
politicians and legal authorities to take action. But the 
free press is not a panacea, of course. Media exposure 
is no guarantee that action will be taken to stop the 
malfeasance. Authoritarian leaders have a broad array 
of means to intimidate or shut down independent 
editors and journalists, from tax inspections to assassi-
nations. Russian experience shows that the media may 
themselves become part of the politics of corruption, 
being used as a vehicle for throwing dirt on political 
opponents. In the summer of 1997 a war of compromis-
ing materials or kompromat flooded the Russian media, 
as rival clan leaders battled over the spoils of privatiza-
tion. (The low point was the release of a grainy video 
of the justice minister cavorting in a mob-connected 
bathhouse.) Finally, one should note that repeated 
public airing of corruption in the media may merely 
serve to encourage public cynicism and the conviction 
that everybody is breaking the rules.
Likewise, while an independent judiciary is often 
seen as a sine qua non for effective anti-corruption 
campaign, experience suggests that the judiciary can 
only succeed if the broader political context is favor-
able. A judiciary that is “too” independent of the 
political system may lack the authority to go after the 
top dogs of the corrupt establishment (as may be tnie in 
India). If the judiciary is so independent as to become 
a political power in its own right, that too can generate 
concern that justice is not being served by anti-corrup-
tion campaigns—witness the controversy around the 
motives of the investigating magistrates in the 
Tangentopoli scandal in Italy. 2
These caveats aside, most would agree that it would 
be better for Russia to have liberal institutions than not 
to have them. The key problem is how to get these 
institutions into place. Social institutions cannot easily 
be exported. Proffering advice and lending money to 
promote their adoption does not seem to have worked 
in the Russian case. What is lacking in the orthodox 
liberal account is some explanation of the politics of 
anti-corruption: what incentives are there for local 
elites to embrace these measures at anything beyond a 
rhetorical level?
22 Stanton Burnett and Luca Mantovani, The Italian Guillotine 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
1998).
(2) Democratization. A more refined version of the 
liberal solution relies upon democratization as the 
decisive factor in promoting rule of law and hence a 
diminution of corruption. The prevalence of corrupt 
practices benefits a small privileged elite at the expense 
of the majority. Giving real political power to that 
exploited majority through the introduction of competi-
tive elections should increase the prospects for an 
effective anti-corruption drive.
The problem is that in practice one sees few exam-
ples of leaders coming to power on an anti-corruption 
ticket, and even fewer cases where that leadership 
successfully tackles corruption. Unscrupulous leaders 
may rise to power using the rhetoric of “clean hands,” 
but on winning office they merely replace the former 
corrupt officials with their own cronies. Boris Yeltsin’s 
own efforts to battle corruption have seen few heads 
roll, and have amounted to little more than populist 
gestures, such as the abortive 1997 campaign to have 
state officials renounce their foreign limousines in 
favor of Russian Volgas. In April 1997 a presidential 
decree instructed all senior government officials to file 
a declaration of family income and assets. This pro-
duced some laughable results. (For 1998, the executive 
secretary of the CIS Boris Berezovsky, a businessman 
who is described by Forbes magazine as a billionaire, 
reported net assets of $38,000.)
Unfortunately, experience around the globe sug-
gests that democratization is not an antidote to corrup-
tion, but may in fact be highly compatible with the 
persistence of rule-evasion. Part of the problem is that 
many societies adopt a charade of electoral competition 
while preserving power in the hands of a narrow elite. 
Indonesia and the Philippines are examples of such a 
“quasi-democracy” or “pseudo-democracy.” Introduc-
ing a quasi-democracy is quite easily accomplished. 
Developing a real democracy with a competitive party 
system, in which ordinary people can exercise real 
power over their leaders, is far more difficult. And 
even well-established democracies can fall prey to 
corruption: witness the campaign finance scandals that 
have dogged nearly every developed democracy. The 
huge sums of money which are required to run profes-
sional party bureaucracies and mount media election 
campaigns can often only be obtained through quasi- 
legal means, either tapping into the public purse, or 
soliciting donations from powerful interest groups.
(3) The robber baron argument. One cynical approach 
is to concede that corrupt elites cannot be displaced 
from power by pressure from outside (the international 
community) or from below (a mobilized public). They
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will only abandon rule-evasion when they conclude that 
it is in their own interest to do so.
Adherents of this position argue that liberalism and 
democracy fail to address the reality of political power 
in the transition societies. The ruling elite is strong 
enough to prevent liberal-democratic institutions from 
working to promote good government. Hence the only 
hope for a diminution of corruption is that the leading 
beneficiaries of the rule-evading society—the corrupt 
elite—will eventually realize that it is in their interest 
to create a framework of law and order. As Thomas 
Hobbes observed, even the richest person in society is 
vulnerable to a blade in the back from an irate peasant. 
Hence the Russian elite will tire of having to spend a 
large portion of its wealth protecting their families from 
kidnappers. Having accumulated wealth through trade 
and financial intermediation, they will see that long-
term prosperity requires long-term investment in 
productive assets: something that will not happen in 
Russia unless the rule of law is strengthened.
A parallel line of argument is to suggest that some 
sort of Darwinian struggle has been taking place 
between the financial magnates (and for that matter 
between Mafia gangs). After a few years of strife a 
power hierarchy will emerge, perhaps regionally 
segregated, and these bosses will be able to strike deals 
with each other in a fairly civilized and predictable 
fashion. Slowly but surely these bosses will gravitate 
towards the state apparatus, since what is the state but 
a large, sophisticated, monopolistic protection racket? 
One can also use the diminishing marginal utility of 
money argument. Having achieved a certain level of 
wealth, corrupt leaders will lose interest in making 
more money, and will explore charitable and patriotic 
outlets as a way to achieve more lofty and lasting 
rewards.
Unfortunately, it is something of a leap of faith to 
believe that the Mafia leopard will change its spots. 
Just because some societies managed to pass through a 
phase of corrupt elite rule is no guarantee that others 
will follow the same path. Argument by analogy is 
inherently deceptive. Why should present-day Russia 
resemble nineteenth-century America, and not, say, 
contemporary Nigeria? After all, there are some impor-
tant structural differences between modern Russia and 
robber baron America. First, the latter country had 
experienced 200 years of civil society, limited democ-
racy and rule of law, none of which is true for Russia. 
Second, the robber barons flourished in an epoch of 
rapid economic expansion, improving efficiency, rising 
living standards and a booming population. In contrast, 
the Russian robber barons are profiting from a collaps-
ing economy and a stagnant if not impoverished 
society.
A third element of difference, connected to the 
second, is that the Russian elite is exercising an exit 
option. They are taking their money, and their families, 
and moving them abroad—to Cyprus, the South of 
France, and elsewhere. Electronic banking and jet 
travel make the exit option more attractive for elites of 
the late twentieth century than was the case in previous 
eras.
(4) The strongman scenario. It is widely assumed that 
the natural response to anarchy is order imposed from 
above, by a new “strongman” leader. Rather than 
waiting for the incumbent corrupt elite to change its 
ways, perhaps only the arrival in power of a new 
counter-elite will bring about a change in the status 
quo. This new leadership will probably come to power 
through violence (by coup, revolution or foreign 
conquest); will originate from a social group bearing 
values distinct from those of the corrupt elite. The 
typical source for such strongmen is of course the 
military, but new sources appear from time to time 
(such as the Afghan Taliban).
The record of “strongmen” rulers in battling corrup-
tion is rather poor. As Lord Acton noted in the last 
century, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Outsid-
ers may quickly succumb to corruption once they 
become insiders. Recall that Alaksandr Lukashenka, 
the dictatorial president of Belarus, rose to power in the 
Belarusian parliament through his energetic anti-
corruption investigations. Similarly, Vladimir Meciar, 
who presides over one of the most corrupt regimes in 
Europe, is one of the few politicians in the region to 
have won twice in fair elections. After experiencing 
decades of dictatorial rule, only about a third of the 
Russian public evince any enthusiasm for a strongman 
regime (as reflected in opinion polls and voting pat-
terns).
(5) Economic competition. The market economist 
will put her faith in increased competition as the best 
long-term antidote to corruption. The core strategy is to 
shrink the size of the public sector through deregulation 
and privatization, thereby diminishing the opportunities 
for rent-seeking behavior by bureaucrats and politi-
cians. State contracts should be allocated through
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